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The Cost of Free Speech: Combating 
Fake News or Upholding the First 
Amendment? 
BRITTANY FINNEGAN* 
This Note examines the pervasive and evolving “fake news” 
problem. Specifically, it explores whether the United States govern-
ment could pass legislation, modeled after a recently passed Ger-
man law, regulating propagandistic social media posts. The answer 
to this question, in short, is no. By comparing the German Basic Law 
and the U.S. Constitution, this Note highlights the stringency of U.S. 
First Amendment protections and underscores the U.S. govern-
ment’s inability to combat fake news through legislation. While this 
Note primarily focuses on the prevalence of fake news in the context 
of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, related developments and ar-
eas of research continue to emerge. Nevertheless, the underlying 
analysis and conclusions this Note sets forth can be applied to the 
2020 U.S. presidential election as well as the local, state, and con-
gressional elections that have since occurred. Indeed, 2020 has 
proven that the fake news problem remains omnipresent, and the 
government is still unable to regulate it.  
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful for the 
extensive efforts of the editors of the University of Miami Law Review in prepar-
ing this Note for publication. I also deeply appreciate the mentorship and insight-
ful comments I received from Professor Caroline Corbin during the writing pro-
cess. And finally, I am grateful to Professor Cheryl Zuckerman for her valuable 
feedback and suggestions to earlier drafts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The amazing growth of social networking and online media over 
the last twenty years has given rise to what many call a “fake news”1 
epidemic.2 The dissemination of false information—aimed to 
 
 1 See Ryan Kraski, Combating Fake News in Social Media: U.S. and Ger-
man Legal Approaches, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 923, 923–24 (2017) (defining 
“fake news” in context of social media and relatively new phenomena of instant, 
internet media “reporting”). 
 2 See Andrea Diaz, ‘Misinformation’ Is Crowned Dictionary.com’s Word of 
the Year, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018, 6:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
11/26/us/misinformation-dictionary-word-of-the-year-2018-trnd/index.html. In 
fact, in 2018, “misinformation” was deemed the word of the year. Id. Addition-
ally, “fake news” was used so much, that Oxford English Dictionary now recog-
nizes it as an official word. See New Words list October 2019, OXFORD ENG. 
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influence democratic elections3 and to incite hate4—has spread 
across the globe. Countries are now faced with a predicament: pass 
legislation to combat fake news or refrain from regulation due to 
free speech laws.5 
Part I of this Note defines the term “fake news” and highlights 
the present dialogue surrounding the phenomena. Part II then ex-
plores a statute, passed in Germany, regulating social media posts. 
The statute, the Network Enforcement Act6 (the “NEA”), requires 
social media companies to remove criminal content from their sites. 
This Part also explores German Basic Law and whether the NEA 
would be considered constitutional by exploring German freedom 
of expression doctrine.7 Part III then analyzes whether a similar law 
to the NEA, if passed in the United States, would be constitutional 
or violate the First Amendment. 
Lastly, this Note will discuss counter-speech as a viable alterna-
tive to combating fake news propaganda online.8 Specifically, this 
Note argues that counter-speech, as it stands in the United States, is 
not as effective as it could be. By comparing the United Kingdom’s 
news infrastructure, specifically the British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (“BBC”) network, to the current public broadcasting networks 
in the United States, this Note highlights the shortcomings of the 
 
DICTIONARY (Oct. 2019) https://public.oed.com/updates/new-words-list-october-
2019/. 
 3 See infra Part I.B. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Molly Quell, More Countries Pass ‘Fake News’ Laws in Pandemic 
Era, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (June 5, 2020), https://www.courthouse
news.com/more-countries-pass-fake-news-laws-in-pandemic-era/; Ashley 
Westerman, ‘Fake News’ Law Goes into Effect in Singapore, Worrying Free 
Speech Advocates, NPR (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/02/
766399689/fake-news-law-goes-into-effect-in-singapore-worrying-free-speech-
advocates. 
 6 Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NETZDG] [Network Enforcement Act], 
Sept. 1, 2017, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] I at 3352 (Ger.); 
official translation at http://perma.cc/72JK-3KNM [hereinafter NetzDG]. 
 7 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] [CONSTITUTION], art. 5 (Ger.) 
[hereinafter [GG] [BASIC LAW]], translation at https://www.gesetze-im-inter-
net.de/englisch_gg/. 
 8 See Daniel Jones & Susan Benesch, Combating Hate Speech Through 
Counterspeech, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC. AT HARVARD 
UNIV. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://cyber.harvard.edu/story/2019-08/combating-hate-
speech-through-counterspeech. 
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U.S. news infrastructure. This Note concludes by arguing that the 
U.S. government should invest in the Corporate Public Broadcasting 
(the “CPB”) to increase the quality, quantity, and reliability of coun-
ter-speech efforts in the United States. 
I. WHAT IS FAKE NEWS? 
A. Definition 
Fake news9 is not a new concept.10 Since the inception of the 
newspaper, and even before then, there has been truth manipulation, 
propaganda, and the dissemination of false information throughout 
society.11 However, the term “fake news”12 has many different 
meanings. The definition of fake news, for the purpose of this Note, 
refers to the phenomenon of false, unsupported assertions of fact or 
information spreading across the internet, specifically the unique 
misinformation posted on social media for political purposes.13 This 
misinformation can have disastrous consequences for the 
 
 9 Kraski, supra note 1, at 923–24 (defining “fake news” in the context of 
social media and the relatively new phenomena of instant, internet media “report-
ing”). 
 10 See Steven Seidenberg, Fake News Has Long Held a Role in American 
History, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti-
cle/history_fake_news; Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 846 n.1 (2018). 
 11 See Shankar Vendatam et al., Fake News: An Origin Story, NPR (June 25, 
2018, 9:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/25/623231337/fake-news-an-
origin-story. 
 12 See Kraski, supra note 1, at 923–24 (defining “fake news” in context of 
social media and relatively new phenomena of instant, internet media “report-
ing”); Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 
95 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 119 (2018) (“The Booking Institution defines fake 
news as content ‘generated by outlets that masquerade as actual media sites but 
promulgate false or misleading accounts designed to deceive the public.’”); Nina 
I. Brown & Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government Regulation and 
Control of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 521–22 (2018) (defining fake 
news as “a media product fabricated and disguised to look like credible news that 
is posted online and circulated via social media.”). 
 13 Miles Parks, Social Media Usage Is at An All-Time High. That Could Mean 
A Nightmare for Democracy, NPR (May 27, 2020, 5:02 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2020/05/27/860369744/social-media-usage-is-at-an-all-time-high-
that-could-mean-a-nightmare-for-democr. 
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democratic process.14 For instance, misinformation online destabi-
lizes the truth, making it harder for people to discern what is real 
and what is false.15 This destabilization can lead people to form 
opinions and thoughts on false facts, which in turn influence how 
they vote in elections.16 
B. Fake News in Real Life 
Fake news is disseminated across social media platforms every 
day.17 The propagation of such information has, arguably, greatly 
impacted public life and democratic political processes as a whole.18 
It is almost impossible to watch the nightly news or listen to a polit-
ical press conference without hearing the term “fake news.”19 Ac-
cording to one study, in 2016 alone, the twenty largest fake news 
stories posted online, many centering around the presidential elec-
tion, “generated 8.7 million shares, reactions, and comments” on so-
cial media.20 In contrast, the top twenty news stories from legitimate 
news sites only generated 7.4 million interactions.21 
As the term fake news continues to proliferate political dialogue, 
many believe that it poses a “unique threat” to informed 
 
 14 See Sabrina Tavernise & Aidan Gardiner, ‘No One Believes Anything’: 
Voters Worn Out by a Fog of Political News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/us/polls-media-fake-news.html. These 
consequences may be complete disengagement from the democratic process, and 
mistrust of the news altogether, creating a “new normal” in society where “[m]any 
people are numb and disoriented, struggling to discern what is real.” Id. 
 15 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Unconstitutionality of Government Propa-
ganda, 81 OHIO L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 21). 
 16 See Nat Stern, Judicial Candidates’ Right to Lie, 77 MD. L. REV. 774, 781 
(2018) (“[D]issemination of misinformation to the voting public threatens to de-
feat the very promise of democratic self-government. The success of this system 
depends on the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices about the alternative 
visions they are offered.”). 
 17 See Theodore Weng, Social Media Has Been Hiding a Fake News Prob-
lem, L. TECH. TODAY (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/
2020/08/social-media-has-been-hiding-a-fake-news-problem/. 
 18 See Stern, supra note 16. 
 19 See, e.g., Fake News, NPR, https://www.npr.org/tags/502124007/fake-
news (last visited Jan. 24, 2021). 
 20 Darrell M. West, How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-
combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/. 
 21 Id. 
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democracies.22 Fake news has, thus, raised concern across the globe, 
posing the question of whether social media companies should bear 
the responsibility of regulating the content posted on their sites.23 
This concern centers particularly around Russian interference in the 
2016 United States presidential election, the 2016 Brexit vote in the 
United Kingdom, and the 2017 election of President Macron in 
France.24 
In the United States, a grand jury indicted thirteen Russian indi-
viduals for their connection to what the U.S. Department of Justice 
called a “[s]cheme to [i]nterfere in the United States [P]olitical 
[S]ystem.”25 The interference in the 2016 presidential election alleg-
edly had two prongs: (1) “the hacking and leaking of e-mails from 
the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton’s campaign 
chairman, John Podesta” and (2) “a campaign of misinformation and 
propaganda carried out largely over social media.”26 The indictment, 
however, only relates to the second prong.27 
In the years since the 2016 election, it has become even more 
clear how deeply Russian “troll farms” infiltrate social media sites 
 
 22 Nabiha Syed, Real Talk about Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for 
Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. F. 337, 337 (2017). 
 23 See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Inter-
mediary Liability to Responsibility, 26 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 1 (2017) (dis-
cussing theory of intermediary liability and its application to social media com-
panies); Liat Clark, Facebook and Twitter Must Tackle Hate Speech or Face New 
Laws, WIRED UK (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/us-tech-giants-
must-tackle-hate-speech-or-face-legal-action (arguing that social media compa-
nies should prioritize critical thinking to tackle fake news). 
 24 Jan van der Made, Russian Outlets Sparked Macron’s Fake News Law 
Plan, Analysts, RFI (Jan. 4, 2018, 5:17 PM), http://en.rfi.fr/europe/20180104-
france-fake-news-law-macron-russia-angry-deny-sputnik-rt. 
 25 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Rus-
sian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the 
United States Political System (Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-thirteen-rus-
sian-individuals-and-three-russian-companies-scheme-interfere. 
 26 Adrian Chen, What Mueller’s Indictment Reveals about Russia’s Internet 
Research Agency, NEW YORKER (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/what-muellers-indictment-reveals-about-russias-internet-re-
search-agency. 
 27 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, supra note 25. 
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and flood them with misinformation.28 According to one study,29 
which has tracked Russian online information operations since 
2014, Russia used thousands of botnets, teams of paid human 
“trolls,” and networks of websites and social-media accounts to 
“amplify” false or misleading internet posts.30 Specifically, the 
study reveals that Russia disseminated propaganda material online 
to: (1) “tarnish democratic leaders or undermine institutions”; (2) 
weaken both “citizen and investor confidence” in capitalist econo-
mies; (3) magnify social issues; and (4) “promote fear of global ca-
lamity.”31 
The study also explicitly states that there were “a number of 
technical indicators,” that Russian propaganda affected the 2016 
United States presidential election. 32 Most telling was the “synchro-
nization of messaging and disinformation” by thousands of Russian 
bots.33 Collectively, these bots were posting massive amounts of dis-
information online, flooding the internet with hundreds of posts a 
day.34 The study also revealed that Russia’s activities on social me-
dia “could tip the balance of an electoral outcome by influencing a 
small fraction of a voting public,”35 and that social media in general 
can effect controversial political decisions such as the Brexit vote 
and other political elections across the globe.36 
Overall, Clint Watts, one of the co-authors of the study, a fellow 
at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and senior fellow at the 
Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington 
University, stated that Russian propaganda online advanced a 
 
 28 The Daily, The Sunday Read: ‘The Agency’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/20/podcasts/the-daily/russia-trolls-misinfor-
mation.html (discussing a Russian communications agency, “The Internet Re-
search Agency” that employed thousands of people to act as internet “trolls” 
whose job was to interfere in American society and elections). 
 29 Andrew Weisburd et al., Trolling for Trump: How Russia Is Trying to De-
stroy Our Democracy, WAR ON ROCKS (Nov. 6, 2016), https://waron-
therocks.com/2016/11/trolling-for-trump-how-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-our-
democracy/. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Weisburd et al., supra note 29. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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political agenda to “erode trust in mainstream media, public figures, 
government institutions—everything that holds the unity of the Re-
public together.”37 
II. THE GERMAN SOLUTION TO FAKE NEWS 
In Germany, fake news and the effect of online propaganda on 
society was a growing problem.38 After the Charlie Hebdo attacks 
in Paris in 2015, the dissemination of hate speech and propaganda 
online inched towards center stage in German politics.39 That same 
year, the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection “set 
up a ‘task force’ to address the problem.”40 However, by 2016, the 
German government was dissatisfied with the providers’ self-regu-
lation.41 The German government resolved that self-regulation had 
to be supplemented by government regulation.42 With the goal of 
improving the enforcement of existing laws on illegal speech online, 
the NEA43 was introduced.44 
While this Part is non-conclusive as to the constitutionality of 
the NEA, it provides an illustrative look at why the Act is likely 
 
 37 Jill Dougherty, The Reality Behind Russia’s Fake News, CNN (Dec. 2, 
2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/02/politics/russia-fake-news-reality/in-
dex.html. 
 38 See Amol Rajan, Germany Leads Fightback Against Fake News, BBC 
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-38991973. 
 39 Imara McMillan, Enforcement Through the Network: The Network En-
forcement Act and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 252, 257–60 (2019). 
 40 Thomas Wischmeyer, ‘What is Illegal Offline is Also Illegal Online’—The 
German Network Enforcement Act 2017, FUNDAMENTAL RTS. PROT. ONLINE: 
FUTURE REGUL. INTERMEDIARIES 2 (2019). The task force consisted of represent-
atives from the largest social media companies, including Twitter and Facebook, 
who all promised to increase their internal mechanisms to remove illegal posts. 
Id. at 2–3. 
 41 See id. at 4 (citing Press Release, jugendschutz.net, ‘Löschung 
rechtswidriger Hassbeiträge bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter’ (Sept. 26, 
2016), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/News/Artikel/0314
2017_Monitoring_jugendschutz.net.pdf (discussing German Federal Ministry of 
Justice and Consumer Protection study of social media providers’ removal of il-
legal content). 
 42 See id. at 5. 
 43 NetzDG, supra note 6, § 3, ¶ 2. 
 44 McMillan, supra note 39, at 259–60. 
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constitutional and underscores the contrasts between German Basic 
Law and the U.S. Constitution. These differences will be relevant to 
a proceeding discussion within this paper about why a similar law 
to the NEA would be unconstitutional in the United States. 
A. The Network Enforcement Act 
In January 2018, Germany began enforcing a new law called 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, or the NEA,45 which compels social 
media platforms to remove any content deemed unlawful within 
seven days from the receipt of a complaint.46 The providers also 
have twenty-four hours to remove content that is “manifestly unlaw-
ful,” after being notified of it.47 The NEA bans specific speech, enu-
merated in the German Criminal Code,48 including the “[d]issemi-
nation of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations.”49 
The entire basis of the Act is to protect citizens from illegal and 
harmful speech, including hate speech and “‘fake news’”50 and to 
 
 45 Id. at 254; NetzDG, supra note 6, § 6. 
 46 NetzDG, supra note 6, § 3, ¶ 2.3. 
 47 Id. at § 3, ¶ 2.2. 
 48 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], §§ 86, 86a, 89a, 91, 100a, 
111, 126, 129 to 129b, 130, 131, 140, 166, 184b, 184d, 185–187, 201a, 241, 269 
(Ger.), translation at https://perma.cc/A6EV-LPWZ (relevant offenses include 
the dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organizations (sec-
tion 86 STGB), the preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the state 
(section § 89a STGB), public incitement to commit a crime (section 111 STGB), 
the forming of criminal and terrorist organizations (section 129 to section 129b 
STGB), inciting hatred (section 130 STGB), the dissemination of depictions of 
violence (section 131 STGB), the defamation of religions, religious and ideologi-
cal associations (section 166 STGB), the distribution, acquisition, and possession 
of child pornography (section 184b and section 184d STGB), insult and defama-
tion (section 185 to 187 STGB), the violation of intimate privacy by taking pho-
tographs (section 201a STGB), and threats of committing a felony (section 241 
STGB)). 
 49 Id. at § 86. 
 50 German Government letter responding to David Kaye, Special Rapporteur 
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/8K9B-3YC8 (arguing that measures taken 
through the NEA were necessary in wake of fake news era, Russian interference 
in foreign elections through social media, and rampant radicalization of hate 
groups online); see David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of the Right of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Letter to the German 
Government (June 1, 2017) (on file with the U.N. at U.N. Doc. OL/DEU/1/2017), 
https://perma.cc/7WNL-ML9A. 
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increase the transparency and responsibility of social media compa-
nies regarding technological systems for removing such content.51 
The NEA has been criticized for its infringement on free speech 
rights,52 yet the German government has staunchly supported the 
opposite, stating that the NEA protects German civil rights.53 
It is not currently possible to predict how the German courts 
might deal with the freedom of expression issues posed by the en-
actment of the NEA. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
(“GFCC”) has not ruled explicitly on the fundamental rights impli-
cations of online monitoring.54 The following analysis is, therefore, 
hypothetical and based solely on German free speech case law. 
However, there are reasons, based on current German freedom of 
expression doctrine, to think that the GFCC may uphold the legisla-
tion as acceptable.55 First, the German Basic Law has set forth 
 
 51 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Begründung zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken’ (BT-Drs. 
18/12356) (May 16, 2017), https://www.computerundrecht.de/1812727.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SLD4-DACA] [Explanatory Memorandum to the Network En-
forcement Act] (stating that there is a need to improve law enforcement in social 
networks in order to promptly remove objectively criminal content, such as “in-
citement, insult, defamation, or disruption of public peace by faking offenses”). 
 52 Josie Le Blond, In Germany, A Battle Against Fake News Stumbles into 
Legal Controversy, WORLD POLICY (June 12, 2017), https://world-
policy.org/2017/06/12/in-germany-a-battle-against-fake-news-stumbles-into-le-
gal-controversy/. 
 53 See Tough New German Law Puts Tech Firms and Free Speech in Spot-
light, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/busi-
ness/technology/tough-new-german-law-putstech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spot-
light-1.3346155 [https://perma.cc/7ZP8-62AZ] (quoting Justice minister Heiko 
Maas saying, “‘Incitement to murder, threats, insults and incitement of the masses 
or Auschwitz lies are not an expression of freedom of opinion but rather attacks 
on the freedom of opinion of others.’”). 
 54 See Press Release, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional 
Court), Obligation to unlock a Facebook account in temporary legal protection 
(May 22, 2019), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Pressemitteilungen/DE/2019/bvg19-038.html (summarizing court’s decision in a 
case concerning removal of content by Facebook in compliance with NEA and 
subsequent removal of plaintiff’s account, highlighting that it is unclear under 
constitutional law whether either of those actions infringe on any basic rights); 
BVERFGE, BVQ 42/19 (May 22, 2019), https://www.bundesverfas-
sungsgericht.de/e/qk20190522_1bvq004219.html (original decision). 
 55 See Wischmeyer, supra note 40, at 11–17 (suggesting that the NEA may 
be constitutional); infra Part II.B for exploration of German Basic Law. 
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explicit limits on free speech.56 Second, false facts receive less, or 
even no, protection.57 Third, even protected speech, such as opin-
ions, is subject to a balancing test against other rights.58 
B. German Basic Law 
Post-World War II, Germany called for an abandonment of the 
previous Nazi regime, and the brutally authoritarian government it 
represented.59 The Bonn Constitution, or “Basic Law,”60 created in 
1949, aims to create a system of values based on the dignity of hu-
man beings, 61 and the concept of individual rights.62 The Basic Law 
begins by stating: “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable. To respect 
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”63 The principal 
of human dignity, under the Basic Law, sits at the top of a system of 
ordered values.64 This hierarchy is imperative to understanding the 
constitutional jurisprudence of Germany. 
The hierarchy of values means individual rights such as freedom 
of expression are not absolute.65 For instance, human dignity, lib-
erty, preservation of democratic order, democratic integrity, equal-
ity, personal inviolability, and physical integrity are all examples of 
general values that may be weighed more heavily against the 
 
 56 See infra Part II.C. 
 57 See infra Part II.C.1. 
 58 See infra Part II.C.2. 
 59 See Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional 
Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 248 n.1 (1989). 
 60 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7; see Donald P. Kommers, The Basic Law: 
A Fifty Year Assessment, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 477, 481 (2000). 
 61 See BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF 
TORTS: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 29 (4th ed. 2002) (“A principal aim of the 
Constitution of Bonn of 1949 . . . was to establish unequivocally the liberal, so-
cial, democratic order of the new state based on the principal of legality.”). 
 62 Quint, supra note 59, at 249. 
 63 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1, § 1. 
 64 See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Com-
parison of the American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
305, 321–23 (1999). 
 65 See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSEL A MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 442 (3d ed. 2012). 
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freedom of expression.66 This ordering of values distinguishes Ger-
man free speech law from its American counterpart.67 Indeed, faced 
with a clash, under American free speech jurisprudence, free speech 
usually triumphs.68 In sum, the rights enumerated in the Basic Law 
must conform to this order of values, with human dignity at its 
core.69 
C. The Freedom of Expression in German Basic Law 
Article 5 of the Basic Law grants the right of freedom of 
speech70 while simultaneously stating that such rights “find their 
limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protec-
tion of young persons and in the right to personal honor.”71 It is clear 
from these limitations that the freedom of expression is not intended 
to be an absolute value.72 Under German jurisprudence, each consti-
tutional right and liberty is interrelated and must be reconciled with 
one another.73 Article 5,74 therefore, is subject to explicit limitations 
within other general laws,75 but it must also “be reconciled with the 
 
 66 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1–4 (These rights are listed and guar-
anteed in the German Basic Law, which is organized as a hierarchical system of 
values.); see ULRICH KARPEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 13 (1988). Additionally, the freedom of expression is not “guaranteed 
unlimited” but must be balanced with these other, more highly ranked, rights. Id. 
at 93. 
 67 See Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles Over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. 
(June 11, 1992), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1992/06/11/the-coming-bat-
tles-over-free-speech/ (“The United States stands alone, even among democra-
cies, in the extraordinary degree to which its [C]onstitution protects freedom of 
speech and of the press.”). 
 68 See infra Part III.B. 
 69 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 353 (“[These rights enumerated 
in the Basic Law] have been proclaimed with an important German twist: they are 
to be exercised responsibly and used to foster human dignity within the frame-
work of ordered liberty.”). 
 70 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 1. 
 71 Id. at art. 5, § 2. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 57. 
 74 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5. 
 75 See Douglas-Scott, supra note 64, at 321 (“Freedom of expression is an 
essential feature of the German Constitution. The free expression provisions of 
German Constitutional law, however, interact with measures in the German 
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rights and liberties of other persons and groups as well as with other 
individuals and social interests recognized by the constitution.”76 
Under the Basic Law, in a clash between freedom of expression and 
other rights or liberties, freedom of speech may lose.77 German 
courts, moreover, must balance78 the right to freedom of expression 
with other constitutional rights, such as the right to human dignity 
and the preservation of democratic order, to ensure that all values of 
the rights in question are properly protected.79 For instance, expres-
sions of opinion are generally protected under the Basic Law.80 
However, the “expression of [an] opinion [that] encroaches” on an-
other person’s right to personality or human dignity may not be pro-
tected.81 
 
Criminal Code designed to prohibit racist expression in a way that would not be 
possible under American law.”). 
 76 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 442. 
 77 See Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 797, 831–32 (1997). In this balancing test, certain speech 
is granted more weight than others. In Germany, “[s]peech is valued according to 
its utility in promoting desirable ends.” Id. at 805; see infra Part II.C.2 (discussing 
cases in German jurisprudence where other basic rights were upheld over right to 
free expression). 
 78 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 66 (discussing the balancing 
objective of German Constitutional analysis). 
 79 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
Jan. 15, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVer-
fGE] 198 (Ger.) ] [hereinafter Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198] [https://germanlawar-
chive.iuscomp.org/?p=51, translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 
443–44. Rather than interpreting Lüth’s Article 5 right to free speech and deciding 
the case based on those constitutional merits alone, the Court balanced whether 
the speech infringed on any constitutional interests of Harlan, the moving party, 
or violated any protections provided under “‘general laws.’” Id. at 447. The Court 
rejected the argument that complainant should have refrained from “boycotting 
out of regard for Harlan’s professional interests and economic interests.” Id. at 
448. While the free speech claim in the Lüth case technically won, the Federal 
Constitution Court nonetheless established that constitutional interests in speech 
must be balanced with “‘general laws’” that represent community or individual 
interests. See Quint, supra note 59, at 286 (discussing balancing test established 
in Lüth). 
 80 Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, 
supra note 65, at 445 (“The basic right to freedom of opinion, as the most imme-
diate expression of the human personality living in society, is one of the noblest 
of human rights.”). 
 81 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 446. 
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Certain speech, moreover, is excepted from constitutional pro-
tection altogether: expressions that threaten the democratic social 
order,82 violence,83 speech that undermines human dignity (e.g., 
“hate speech” as we know it in the United States),84 group defama-
tion, and incitement.85 In contrast, American constitutional law pro-
tects speech advocating illegal conduct,86 hate speech,87 and lies.88 
In cases against government regulation under German law, an 
interference with the freedom of expression can be justified by the 
provisions of general laws, provisions for the protection of young 
persons, or the right to personal honor.89 It is important to note that, 
while the Basic Law places statutory limits on the freedom of 
 
 82 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 
7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 
278 (Ger.), translated in German Case: Bundesflagge Decision, Foreign Law 
Translations, https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/ger-
man/case.php?id=632 (“The flag serves as an important integration device 
through the leading state goals it embodies; its disparagement can thus impair the 
necessary authority of the state.”). 
 83 See id. (finding the legislature can pass laws preventing children from gain-
ing access to materials that glorify violence or crime, provoke racial hatred, glo-
rify war, or depict sexual acts in a crude, offensive, and shameful manner). 
 84 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 471 (“Thus, freedom of opinion 
must always take second place where the statement actually affects another’s hu-
man dignity.”) (quoting Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] 1995, 93 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
[BVerfGE] 266 (Ger.)). 
 85 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], 
Apr. 13, 1994, 90, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
[BVerfGE] 241 (Ger.), [hereinafter Holocaust Denial 90 BVerfGE 241], trans-
lated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 493–97. 
 86 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (holding 
that Brandenburg did not incite or produce imminent lawless action by making a 
speech at a KKK rally and, therefore, Ohio statute criminalizing syndicalism vio-
lated Brandenburg’s First Amendment rights). 
 87 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (“The First Amendment 
does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who 
express views on disfavored subjects.”). 
 88 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (constitutional protection 
does not turn upon “the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs 
which are offered”). 
 89 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 2 (“These rights shall find their 
limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young 
persons, and in the right to personal honor.”). 
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expression, the limits themselves have limits.90 There are differing 
academic opinions when it comes to defining a “general law.”91 
However, Germany’s highest court, the GFCC, has determined that 
a general law is not a law that seeks to prohibit the articulation of an 
opinion, but rather, its main function is to protect or promote a le-
gally protected interest.92 
The GFCC must determine the proportionality of the regulation 
in relation to the rights at issue.93 Under this principal, the basic 
rights of German citizens may only be limited if the government re-
striction is the only means of achieving the specified aims.94 This 
“principal of proportionality consists of three requirements.”95 The 
first requirement is suitability.96 The restriction, in other words, 
must be able to actually “achieve the purpose intended.”97 The next 
requirement is necessity, or otherwise known as “least interfer-
ence.”98 Under this element, the restriction is only valid if it is shown 
that there are no other means to efficiently accomplish the same aims 
without the interference.99 Lastly, the restriction must be 
 
 90 See SABINE MICHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 81–83 (1999). 
 91 See Mehrdad Payandeh, The Limits of Freedom of Expression in the Wun-
siedel Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 11 GER. L.J. 929, 
932–33 (2010) (discussing different interpretations of “general law” by German 
scholars). 
 92 See id. at 929, 932 (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court], Nov. 4, 2009, 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUN
GSGERICHTS [BVerfGE]). 
 93 See MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 90, at 81–83. The Court also 
looks to other requirements to determine if a regulation will survive constitutional 
scrutiny: (1) the restriction must not be of the “essential character[istics] of a basic 
right”; (2) the restriction cannot be aimed at individual cases; (3) the restriction 
“must expressly name” the basic right seeking to be limited; (4) there must be 
legal certainty; and (5) the restriction must adhere to the principal of proportion-
ality. See id. However, proportionality is the most relevant to this Note. 
 94 Id. at 83. 
 95 Id. at 83–84. 
 96 Id. at 83. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 90, at 83. 
 99 See id. 
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appropriate.100 To determine the appropriateness of the restriction, 
the GFCC balances the right being limited with the interest being 
pursued.101 
This analysis is very similar to strict scrutiny in the United 
States;102 however, based on the order of values within the Basic 
Law, it seems German Courts are more willing to accept a govern-
ment interest as compelling. Overall, the right to freedom of expres-
sion in Germany is not absolute and can be limited by “general laws” 
and must also be weighed with other rights granted under the con-
stitution. 
1. WHAT KIND OF SPEECH IS PROTECTED? 
In freedom of expression cases, the German courts must first de-
termine whether a speech is protected under the Basic Law or falls 
into an exception, e.g., speech of such low value that it is not cov-
ered.103 The GFCC, given the language of Article 5, has had to de-
termine whether the freedom of expression under Article 5(1) pro-
tects only opinions, or whether other speech, such as the expression 
of mere fact, especially false facts, deserves constitutional protec-
tion as well.104 The GFCC has established that opinions are pro-
tected, regardless of their content.105 Statements of fact, on the other 
hand, are distinguished from opinions.106 This approach is strikingly 
different from American constitutional law, where lies or “false 
fact” still retain full First Amendment protection.107 
This distinction between opinions and false facts is evident in 
the Auschwitz Lie case where the German Court imposed a prior 
 
 100 Id. at 84. 
 101 See id.; infra Part C.II.2 (discussing cases in German jurisprudence where 
these rights are balanced). 
 102 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing strict scrutiny). 
 103 See supra notes 71–80. 
 104 See MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 90, at 200–03. 
 105 See Holocaust Denial 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in 
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 493. (stating that opinions are protected 
by the basic right of art. 5(1)(1)). 
 106 See id. at 493–94 (distinguishing a statement of fact from opinion). 
 107 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206–07 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a 
Neo-Nazi march purposely held in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood was 
protected speech and finding an anti-defamation law by which the Village sought 
to prevent the march invalid). 
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restraint of a demonstration in support of Holocaust denial.108 The 
demonstrators alleged that the court’s decision violated their right to 
exercise their opinions under Article 5.109 The court asserted that the 
freedom of opinion, like all rights to speech, are subject to limita-
tions under Article 5(2).110 These limitations are imposed by statute, 
and a balancing test is conducted to weigh the basic right with the 
legal interest that the statute serves.111 There, the court reasoned that 
the demonstration was based on a clearly false fact112—that the Hol-
ocaust never occurred113—and, therefore, deserved far less constitu-
tional protection.114 
2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND BALANCING 
Next, in cases where the freedom of expression clashes with 
other Basic Law rights, the court must engage in a balancing test 
 
 108 See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in 
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 495 (stating that opinions are protected by 
the basic right of art. 5(1)(1)). This case also highlights an important distinction 
between American and German freedom of expression jurisprudence: hate speech 
is not protected under German Basic Law, whereas it is protected speech under 
the American constitution. See Douglas-Scott, supra note 64, at 324–27 (discuss-
ing the Court’s decision to place an injunction on the conference due to its threat-
ened breaches of sections 130 (incitement to hatred) and 185 (insult) of the crim-
inal code); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam) (re-
quiring that violence be imminent before hateful speech may be proscribed). 
 109 See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in 
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 493. 
 110 See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in 
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 495–96; see also [GG] [BASIC LAW], su-
pra note 7, art. 5, § 2. 
 111 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing this balancing test). 
 112 See Douglas-Scott, supra note 64, at 326–27. However, the Court also es-
tablished that even if the statements in question “were merely opinions rather than 
statements of [false] fact,” the “protection of personal identity over freedom of 
expression” would still be warranted. See id. 
 113 See Holocaust Denial, 90 BVerfGE 241, supra note 85, translated in 
KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 495 (“[Holocaust denial] is a representa-
tion of fact that is demonstrably untrue in the light of in-numerable eye-witness 
accounts, documents, findings of courts in numerous criminal cases, and historical 
analysis.”). 
 114 Id. at 496 (“When insulting opinions that contain representations of fact 
are voiced, it is crucial whether the representations of fact are true or untrue. De-
monstrably incorrect representations of fact do not merit protection.”). 
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between the rights at issue.115 One of the most foundational cases in 
German jurisprudence is the Lüth case, which established the doc-
trine of an objective order of values and identified standards to be 
applied by courts in weighing the rights of speech and other basic 
rights.116 The dispute in Lüth was “between Erich Lüth, a minor of-
ficial in Hamburg, and Veit Harlan, a former director of racist films 
under the Nazis.”117 In 1950, “Harlan directed his first post-war 
movie, Immortal Beloved.”118 “Lüth called for a boycott of Harlan’s 
new film,”119 and Harlan sought an injunction against Lüth that 
would prohibit Lüth from issuing further calls for a boycott of the 
film.120 Finding that Lüth’s statements injured the plaintiffs’ busi-
ness, the state court issued an injunction prohibiting Lüth from pro-
moting any more boycotts of Harlan’s film.121 “In response, Lüth 
filed a ‘constitutional complaint’ in the Federal Constitutional 
Court,” stating the injunction violated his Article 5(1) right to free 
expression.122 
The GFCC ruled that Lüth’s constitutional rights were indeed 
infringed upon.123 However, through this ruling, the GFCC estab-
lished pivotal interpretations of Article 5.124 For one, it solidified the 
Basic Law as a hierarchy of values.125 The GFCC held that the lower 
courts had failed to give the basic value of free speech the proper 
weight when balancing the right to freedom of expression with the 
 
 115 See Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 444. 
 116 See id. (“[T]he Basic Law is not a value-neutral document. Its section on 
basic rights establishes an objective order of values, and this order strongly rein-
forces the effective power of basic rights.”) 
 117 See Quint, supra note 59, at 252–53 and accompanying footnotes (discuss-
ing Lüth). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 253–54. 
 121 See Quint, supra note 59, at 253–54. 
 122 Id. at 254. 
 123 Id.; see Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 448. 
 124 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 449. 
 125 See Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 443–44 (stating that main purpose of basic rights is to 
protect individual against encroachment of public power and that Basic Law 
erects an objective order of values of basic rights). 
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plaintiff’s private rights.126 The GFCC rejected the argument that 
Harlan’s human dignity was infringed upon,127 and the balancing 
test weighed in favor of Lüth’s free speech rights.128 While the free 
speech claim in Lüth technically won, the GFCC, nonetheless, es-
tablished that free speech rights had to be balanced against other 
conflicting rights based on their overall objective values within so-
ciety.129 
Lebach is another important case in German jurisprudence 
showcasing the GFCC’s balancing test, and how free speech rights 
can be overridden by other rights. 130 In Lebach, the GFCC upheld 
an injunction against the showing of a documentary television film 
about a famous robbery of a government ammunitions depot.131 The 
documentary referred to the conspirators by name, described the 
heist with specific facts and accuracy, and highlighted the intimate 
relationship between the male conspirators.132 The documentary was 
to be aired a few years after the robbery and just before the plaintiff 
prisoner’s release.133 
Despite the accuracy of the film, the court ruled in favor of the 
bank robbers.134 It is important to note that the documentary “was 
not claimed to contain false statements.”135 Rather, the court 
 
 126 See id. at 448 (“[T]he regional court, in assessing the behavior of the com-
plainant, has misjudged the special significance of the basic right to freedom of 
opinion.”). 
 127 See Quint, supra note 59, at 286 and accompanying footnotes (discussing 
GFCC’s finding in Lüth that infringement on Harlan’s human dignity could only 
be shown if it was completely excluded from his profession). 
 128 See Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198, supra note 79, translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 448. 
 129 See Quint, supra note 59, at 286 (discussing the Lüth case and the analysis 
the German Constitutional Court implemented to balance two constitutional val-
ues). 
 130 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 
5, 1973, 35, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 
202 (Ger.), [hereinafter Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202] [https://germanlawar-
chive.iuscomp.org/?p=62], translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 
479–83. 
 131 Id. at 479–80, 483. 
 132 Id. at 480. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 483. 
 135 See Quint, supra note 59, at 300 (discussing the German Constitutional 
Court’s analysis in the Lebach case). 
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emphasized the prisoner’s right to human dignity under Article 1 
and freedom of personality under Article 2 of the Basic Law.136 The 
court interpreted that those rights afforded a person to determine 
whether and to what extent others might be permitted to portray his 
life story in general, or certain events from his life.137 In other words, 
this right to personality may be equated with privacy rights in the 
United States.138 The rights of free reporting under Article 5, Section 
1 were then balanced with these rights to human dignity and person-
ality.139 The court emphasized the importance of the freedom of the 
press while also reiterating the limitations of this freedom.140 After 
balancing each constitutional right at issue, the court determined that 
the prisoner’s right to be free from invasion into his personality, 
even by true statements, outweighed the right to free reporting.141 
The outcome of Lebach compared to Lüth highlights the impact 
of the balancing of rights. Both cases show that depending on the 
weight given to free expression versus human dignity, or other com-
peting rights, the law may be speech-restrictive or speech-protec-
tive. In Lebach, it is clear the court valued human dignity and per-
sonality rights over those of free speech142—a trend in German ju-
risprudence beginning with Lüth and continuing today.143 This em-
phasis on human dignity exposes the wide range of judicial 
 
 136 See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202, supra note 130, translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 481. 
 137 See id. at 480. This right, while enumerated in the Basic Law, also rests, in 
part, on a general law that creates a qualified right to control one’s own “picture.” 
See Quint, supra note 59, at 300 n.173 (citing KUNSTURHEBERGESETZ [KUG] 
(German copyright law) §§ 22, 23). 
 138 See Quint, supra note 59, at 279–80. 
 139 See id. 
 140 See Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202, supra note 130, translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 481 (discussing importance of the freedom of the press, 
but also its limitations when at odds with other rights enumerated under Basic 
Law). 
 141 See id. at 483. A factor in the Court’s determination was that the particular 
broadcast was to be made years after the initial robbery and, therefore, lost any 
urgency and importance in informing the public of a significant event. Id. at 482. 
Whereas the prisoner’s right to develop his personality and reintegrate into society 
after his release would be severely compromised by such a damaging and expos-
ing documentary. Id. at 482–83. 
 142 See Quint, supra note 59, at 299–300. 
 143 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 442. 
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decisions possible when the values of certain rights are weighed 
against one another.144 
The Mephisto case similarly reveals the court’s evolution to-
wards greater emphasis on human dignity rights over communica-
tive ones.145 In a famous 3-3 split,146 the court effectively upheld an 
injunction against publication of a novel about a deceased actor.147 
The novel, written by Klauss Mann, was based on Gustaf 
Gründgens, a famous actor during Nazi control of Germany, and di-
rector of the Prussian State Theatre.148 The main character in the 
novel, Hendrik Höfgen, made his name by playing the devil in Goe-
the’s “Faust” during the Nazi period and furthered his career by sid-
ing with those in power in Nazi Germany.149 Despite Mann’s dis-
claimer in the forward of the book stating that all characters repre-
sented general types and not portraits of specific persons, the court 
found that the novel defamed the memory of Gründgens, because 
Höfgen, the character in the novel, paralleled the details of 
Gründgen’s career and life.150 In this case, unlike the previous two 
cases, the right at issue was the right to artistic freedom, under Arti-
cle 5(3) of the Basic Law.151 While Article 5(3) is not subject to the 
same explicit limitations as the freedom of expression under Article 
5(2),152 the court established that artistic freedoms are in fact subject 
to limitations.153 The court emphasizes that the right to artistic free-
dom cannot be limited by statute—as the communicative rights can 
 
 144 See id. 
 145 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], 
Feb. 24, 1971, 30, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUN
GSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 173 (Ger.) [hereinafter Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173] 
[https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=56], translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 519–22. 
 146 See Federal Constitutional Court Law (BVerfGG) § 15(4). Under German 
law, a tie vote results in the lower court ruling remaining in effect. Id. 
 147 See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173, supra note 145. 
 148 Quint, supra note 59, at 291. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 291–92. 
 151 See id.; [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 3. 
 152 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, §§ 2, 3. 
 153 Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173, supra note 145, translated in KOMMERS & 
MILLER, supra note 65, at 520 (establishing that the right of artistic liberty is not 
unlimited). 
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be—but are limited by the Constitution itself.154 Therefore, the right 
to artistic freedom is balanced with the right to human dignity and 
personality rights,155 enumerated under Article 1 of the Basic 
Law.156 Both Mephisto and Lebach highlight the court’s emphasis 
on human dignity and personality rights when in conflict with other 
rights or values, specifically the right to free expression.157 
Speech in Germany is valued in accordance with its promulgat-
ing of desirable ends for society, such as public or political speech, 
art, academic research, and scientific communication.158 However, 
the right to free speech is not unlimited, and if speech conflicts with 
any other constitutionally appointed rights, it will be analyzed based 
on its benefit to society in contrast to the conflicting right.159 Over-
all, German doctrine differs from the U.S. doctrine in two important 
ways. First, there are far more “exceptions” to the freedom of ex-
pression in Germany, because of the statutory limits written directly 
into the Basic Law.160 In the United States, exceptions to protected 
speech are rare and very limited.161 Second, because the rights listed 
under the Basic Law are objectively ordered,162 the GFCC employs 
a balancing test when differing rights and interests are at issue.163 
Freedom of expression is typically given less weight in this balance, 
 
 154 Id. at 520–21. 
 155 See id. (establishing that if the guarantee of artistic freedom gives rise to 
any conflict, it must be resolved by construction in terms of the order of values 
enshrined in the Basic Law). 
 156 [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1. 
 157 See Quint, supra note 59, at 300, 307 (discussing both holdings in Mephisto 
and Lebach). 
 158 See Eberle, supra note 77, at 800 (stating that “[s]peech [in Germany] is 
valued according to its utility in promoting desirable ends”); see also Mephisto, 
30 BVerfGE 173, supra note 145, translated in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 
65, at 520; [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 5, § 2. 
 159 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 66. 
 160 See [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1, §§ 1, 2, 5. 
 161 See infra notes 215–19. 
 162 See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 65, at 66 (discussing the balancing 
objective of German Constitutional analysis). 
 163 See supra Part II.C.2 for a discussion of the Court’s use of this balancing 
test. 
594 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:572 
 
whereas in the United States, freedom of speech is arguably valued 
above all other rights.164 
III. AMERICAN FREE SPEECH LAW 
This Part will explore the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, specifically, free speech jurisprudence and theories, 
and analyze whether a statute, like the Network Enforcement Act, 
would be constitutional in the United States. Compared to the anal-
ysis of German Basic Law, above, U.S. free speech laws are ex-
tremely stringent and do not provide much flexibility when it comes 
to government regulation of fake news. 
A. The First Amendment 
The First Amendment to the Constitution states that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech; or of the 
press . . . .”165 Note that there are no explicit limitations written into 
the text.166 Already, there is a stark contrast between German free-
dom of expression and U.S. free speech.167 This distinction will il-
lustrate why free speech under U.S. jurisprudence is protected more 
often than its German counterpart. 
There are four main theories used by the Supreme Court to jus-
tify protection of the First Amendment: (1) the promotion of the 
marketplace of ideas;168 (2) the promotion of democratic self-
 
 164 See Brian C. Castello, The Voice of Government as an Abridgement of First 
Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989 DUKE L.J. 654, 
654 (1989) (“By proscribing that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . ,’ the first amendment makes an unequivocal statement that 
accords with the traditional view of freedom of expression, and significantly re-
stricts the government’s power to act directly against individual expression.”); 
Rebecca Zipursky, Nuts about NETZ: The Network Enforcement Act and Free-
dom of Expression, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1325, 1343 (2019) (“America has a 
famously robust conception of free speech. While the first right protected in the 
German Basic Law is human dignity, the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights 
protects the freedom to speak.”). 
 165 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 166 See id. 
 167 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 168 See Clay Calvert et al., Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling 
a Disconnect Between Theory and Doctrine, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 99, 124–25 (2018) 
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government;169 (3) the promotion of individual autonomy, self-ex-
pression, and self-realization;170 and (4) a negative theory that prom-
ulgates the idea that the citizens of the United States do not trust the 
government to regulate speech.171 
The marketplace of ideas theory is frequently used by courts to 
resolve free speech cases.172 Under this theory, it is thought that we 
can best uncover truth and advance knowledge by allowing all ideas, 
opinions, and viewpoints to flow freely in the marketplace.173 The 
 
(“[T]he marketplace of ideas model . . . originates in John Milton’s 1644 Areop-
agitica.” John Stuart Mill then elaborated on the marketplace of ideals model over 
200 years later in On Liberty.”); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR 
THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 69 (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co, 
Ltd. 1959) (1644) (ebook) (“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose 
to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and 
prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever 
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”); JOHN STUART MILL 
& JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, ON LIBERTY 118 (David Bromwich, & George Kateb, 
Yale University Press 2003) (1859) (ebook), available at ProQuest Ebook Cen-
tral, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/miami/detail.action?docID=3420105. 
The term “marketplace of ideas,” as we know it today, however, began its devel-
opment with Justice Holmes’ “free trade in ideas,” which was then adapted by 
Justice Brennan into “marketplace of ideas.” See David Cole, Agon at Agora: 
Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 891 
(1986) (noting the importance of the Court’s increasing use of Justice Brennan’s 
phrase “marketplace of ideas” rather than Holmes’ “free trade in ideas.”); Chris-
toph Bezemek, The Epistemic Neutrality of the “Marketplace of Ideas”: Milton, 
Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes on Falsehood and Freedom of Speech, 14 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 159, 173 (2015) (asserting that “[t]he influence Milton and Mill 
had on Holmes’s thought cannot be denied”). 
 169 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1960) (“The primary purpose of 
the First Amendment is . . . that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand 
the issues which bear upon our common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no 
doubt, no belief, no counter-belief, no relevant information, may be kept from 
them. Under the compact upon which the Constitution rests, it is agreed that men 
shall not be governed by others, that they shall govern themselves.”). 
 170 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 
881 (1994). 
 171 See Kraski, supra note 1, at 930. 
 172 See Calvert, supra note 168, at 124 nn.184–85 (discussing marketplace of 
ideas theory in contemporary Supreme Court case law (citing W. Wat Hopkins, 
The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS 
COMM. Q. 40, 47 (1996))). 
 173 See id. at 124. 
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second theory, the promotion of democratic self-government, prom-
ulgates the idea that the free flow of information helps us to vote 
wisely by providing complete access to knowledge and opinions to 
inform our own votes.174 Like the marketplace theory, this theory 
emphasizes the free flow of information.175 Third, the theory of free 
speech as the promotion of individual autonomy and self-expression 
also propagates the idea that freedom of speech helps develop indi-
vidual expression and “self-realization.”176 In other words, freedom 
of speech is necessary for a person to develop personality and to, 
thus, make informed life decisions.177 The last, most important value 
justifying the right to guaranteed freedom of expression is the innate 
aversion to government oversight.178 Underlying many decisions to 
uphold free speech—such as protecting hate speech or lies—is the 
notion that the social cost of any form of government censorship will 
invariably exceed the benefit of regulating the arguably harmful 
speech.179 As Justice Kennedy wrote in United States v. Alvarez: 
“[o]ur constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need 
Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”180 The Supreme Court and scholars 
 
 174 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. 
CT. REV. 245, 254–55 (1961) (“Self-government can exist only insofar as the vot-
ers acquire the intelligence . . . that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to ex-
press.”); see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (2000); see also Calvert, supra note 168, at 131. 
 175 See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT, supra note 174, at 25 (using a metaphor of a town meeting to il-
lustrate theory that “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that 
everything worth saying shall be said”); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an 
Absolute, supra note 174, at 257. 
 176 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (stating that free speech should be protected be-
cause it “fosters self-realization” and “self-determination”). 
 177 See id. 
 178 See Kraski, supra note 1, at 930. 
 179 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Questioning the Value of Dissent and Free 
Speech More Generally: American Skepticism of Government and the Protection 
of Low-Value Speech, in DISSENTING VOICES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE ROLE 
OF JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CITIZENS 221–22 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012). 
 180 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (citing G. ORWELL, 
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (Centennial ed. 2003)). 
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alike have supported and relied upon all of these theories to develop 
modern Free Speech doctrine. 181 
B. Free Speech Jurisprudence 
When presented with a First Amendment challenge, the Su-
preme Court will engage in a certain analysis. First, the Court will 
determine whether the speech at issue is protected under the First 
Amendment.182 Under modern free speech doctrine, not all catego-
ries of speech are worthy of protection.183 The Court has determined 
that certain categories of speech provide such little social value, and 
also cause so much harm, that there is no benefit in protecting 
them.184 For example, obscenity, child pornography, speech that in-
cites imminent lawless action, and fighting words do not deserve 
protection.185 The Supreme Court has also declined to add new 
 
 181 See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: 
Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and Reasonableness Balancing, 8 ELON L. 
REV. 291, 291 (2016). This Note also defines the term “modern” as “beginning 
with the Warren Court in 1954.” Id. 
 182 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 183 See id. (establishing a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech 
may not be prohibited if it “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action” and (2) it “is likely to incite or produce such action.”); Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (holding that obscene material is not protected by the 
First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–83 (1964) 
(providing substantial protection for speech about public figures, but not defama-
tory speech); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) 
(holding that “the constitutional freedom of speech and press extends its immunity 
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid 
criminal statute”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) 
(establishing that words causing a direct harm to their target and could be con-
strued to advocate an immediate breach of the peace are “‘fighting words’” and 
are not protected by the First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
756–64 (1982) (finding a statute targeted against child pornography does not vi-
olate First Amendment); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per 
curiam) (holding that a “political hyperbole” is not a “true ‘threat’” and is thus 
protected by the First Amendment). 
 184 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (“There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem . . . . It has been well ob-
served that such utterances . . . are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”). 
 185 See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–64. 
598 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:572 
 
categories of speech to this list.186 Overall, modern free speech doc-
trine protects unpopular ideas187 and offensive modes of expres-
sion188—even lies.189 
Once the Court determines whether the speech at issue is pro-
tected or falls under one of the categories listed above, the Court 
 
 186 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (declining to add 
lies as a new excepted category of speech). 
 187 See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271, 273. In N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, an Alabama 
jury returned a verdict against the New York Times in favor of a police commis-
sioner who claimed he was libeled by an advertisement. Id. at 256. The advertise-
ment protested the police department’s treatment of civil rights workers, including 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and stated that Mr. King was arrested seven times, 
when in fact he had been arrested four. Id. at 259. The Alabama court found this 
misstatement of fact was sufficient to establish a claim for libel. Id. at 262. How-
ever, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s application of libel law un-
duly inhibited public discourse. Id. at 264. Justice Brennan, who is thought to be 
the chief architect of modern free speech doctrine, stated that “debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.” Id. at 270; see also Bran-
denburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (reversing conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for vio-
lating a state statute that outlawed advocacy of violence or terrorism as a means 
of political reform). The Court in Brandenburg established that a person cannot 
be punished for advocacy of violent activity unless it creates direct incitement or 
“imminent lawless action.” Id. at 447. The Supreme Court’s decisions in N.Y. 
Times and Brandenburg impose strict Frist Amendment safeguards. 
 188 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–26 (1971) (5-4 decision) (extending 
strong First Amendment protection to the use of language or symbols that society 
finds offensive). In Cohen, a young antiwar protester was convicted of breach of 
the peace for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the message “‘Fuck the Draft.’” 
Id. at 16. Speaking for the majority, Justice Harlan wrote that Cohen is protected 
by the Constitution from “arbitrary government interference” and that the govern-
ment has no power to regulate the “substantive message” Cohen wishes to convey. 
Id. at 19. The Court also emphasized that not all speech is given “absolute protec-
tion,” but that the current case is “not an obscenity case” which requires specifi-
cally “erotic,” “obscene expression.” Id. at 19–20. Nor is it an incitement to vio-
lence case. Id. at 22–23. Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson, the Court again protected 
the use of symbols by establishing that there is a Constitutional right to burn an 
American flag as a form of political protest. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 
(1989) (5-4 decision). 
 189 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727 (“The response to the unreasoned, the ra-
tionale; to the uniformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple 
truth”). 
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then determines which level of review to apply.190 The level of re-
view will depend on whether the regulation is content-based or con-
tent-neutral.191 If there is any content-based192 regulation by the gov-
ernment, the Court will use strict scrutiny review.193 
In sum, two aspects of modern free speech doctrine that are im-
portant for this Note are: (1) content-based regulations of speech are 
reviewed using strict scrutiny,194 and (2) unless speech falls into an 
existing excepted category, it will be given first amendment protec-
tion.195 The next sub-Parts will explore both points and illustrate 
why most speech regulations subject to strict scrutiny fail. 
1. STRICT SCRUTINY 
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence places a high value on Free 
Speech.196 Any content-based regulation of speech is presumed 
 
 190 There are other factors, while not relevant to this Note but are still im-
portant to note, that a court will look to when determining which level of review 
to apply. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 883, 908 (1991). For instance, if the speech at issue took place in a public 
forum or private-individual property, and there is content-based regulation con-
sisting of either viewpoint discrimination or subject matter discrimination, the 
Court will use strict scrutiny review. Id. In general, content-based restrictions on 
speech—laws that “appl[y] to particular speech because of the topic discussed or 
the idea or message expressed”—are presumptively unconstitutional and subject 
to strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). Addition-
ally, if the regulation is content-neutral, the Court will use an intermediate review. 
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
790–91 (4th ed. 2011) (ebook) (“Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if 
it is substantially related to an important government purpose.”). 
 191 See Kelso, supra note 181, at 293, 295. 
 192 Reed, 576 U.S. at 172–73 (holding that a town’s Sign Code was content-
based regulation because rules within code applied specifically to messages of the 
sign). 
 193 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 791 (“Under strict scrutiny, a law 
will be upheld if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.”). 
 194 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 195 See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–
64 (1982); Part III.B.2. 
 196 See Dworkin, supra note 67 (“The United States stands alone even among 
democracies, in the extraordinary degree to which its [C]onstitution protects free-
dom of speech and of the press.”). 
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unconstitutional.197 The Court, therefore, reviews government inter-
ference under strict scrutiny.198 The burden is placed on the govern-
ment to overcome strict scrutiny by proving that the regulation at 
issue advances compelling or overriding government ends and is 
narrowly tailored to advance those ends.199 
As an initial matter, to overcome strict scrutiny, the government 
must prove that the content-based regulations were enacted to fur-
ther a compelling purpose.200 The Court has found that the following 
interests are sufficiently compelling: protecting the integrity of the 
voting system,201 protecting against discrimination of women202 or 
 
 197 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“Content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.”); see also Police Dep’t of the City 
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (Court established unconstitution-
ality of content-based regulation). In Mosley, the question before the Court was 
whether a state law banning all peaceful picketing outside of a high school except 
for labor dispute protests, violated the First Amendment. Id. at 93–94. The Court 
stated that the ordinance “describ[ed] permissible picketing in terms of its subject 
matter,” and that the government has “no power to restrict expression because of 
its message.” Id. at 95. The ordinance, rather than describing picketing as imper-
missible because of time, place, or circumstance, stipulated certain picketing as 
illegal based on the message’s content. Id. The distinguishing of general peaceful 
picketing from labor picketing, therefore, restricts speech in an unconstitutional 
way. Id. The Court further emphasized that “[s]elective exclusions from a public 
forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference 
to content alone.” Id. at 96. 
 198 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–
29 (1995) (“[T]he government may not regulate speech based on its substantive 
content or the message it conveys.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 791–92. 
 199 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 791–92 (“Under strict the govern-
ment has the burden of proof. That is, the law will be struck down unless the 
government can show that the law is necessary to accomplish a compelling gov-
ernment purpose.”) 
 200 Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Govern-
ment may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in 
order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to 
further the articulated interest.”). See CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, 
THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1101–02 (2007) (e-treatise), https://lib-
guides.stcl.edu/ld.php?content_id=36280424. 
 201 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196–98 (1992) (finding that a statute 
restricting the areas around voting polling places is necessary to serve the interest 
in protecting the right to vote freely and effectively). 
 202 See Bd. of Dirs. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding that the 
interest in eradicating discrimination against women and assuring that women 
have access to business contacts is sufficiently “compelling”). 
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promoting gender equality,203 protecting the well-being of chil-
dren,204 and protecting captive audiences from offensive communi-
cation.205 In contrast, the Court has found the following interests not 
to be compelling: promoting respect for the American flag206 and 
protecting a non-captive audience from being offended.207 
The second element necessary to overcome strict scrutiny is to 
show that the regulation is absolutely necessary to achieve the de-
sired end.208 The government must prove, therefore, that there are 
no alternative, less restrictive means to further its compelling inter-
est.209 For instance, in Boos v. Barry,210 the government regulation 
at issue was a prohibition on the display of any sign within 500 feet 
of a foreign embassy if that sign tended to bring that foreign gov-
ernment into “‘public odium’” or “‘public disrepute.’”211 The Court 
found that the law at issue was unnecessarily restrictive, because 
there was an equally effective yet less speech-restrictive law212 al-
ready passed by Congress. The alternative law effectively protected 
foreign diplomats from harassing behavior213 while not infringing 
 
 203 See Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (finding “that Min-
nesota’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citi-
zens justifies the impact” of a state statute on a male members’ association). 
 204 See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., 492 U.S. at 126 (“[T]here is a compelling 
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.”). 
 205 See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (“The State’s interest in 
protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the 
highest order in a free and civilized society.”). 
 206 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 387, 418 (1989); see also United States v. 
Eichman, 496 U.S. 308, 311 (1990). 
 207 See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 530, 533–34 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211–
12 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–26 (1971). 
 208 See Sable Communications of Cal., 492 U.S. at 126. The Court sometimes 
uses “narrowly tailored” or “carefully tailored” as synonyms for “necessary.” Id. 
 209 See id. 
 210 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 211 See id. at 316 (quoting D.C. Code § 22–1115 (1981 ed.)). 
 212 See id. at 312; 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2). 
 213 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 325 (“§112 was developed as a deliberate effort to 
implement our international obligations.”). The law subjects to criminal punish-
ment willful acts or attempts to “‘intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign 
official or an official guest or obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his 
duties.’” Id. at 325–26 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2)). 
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on free speech rights.214 The government failed to show why this 
alternative, less restrictive law was insufficient as an alternative to 
the one at issue.215 
2. LIES AND HATE SPEECH ARE AFFORDED FREE SPEECH 
PROTECTION 
As a general rule, the First Amendment protects “all forms of 
communication.”216 As mentioned earlier, there are a few exceptions 
to this rule: obscenity, child pornography, speech that incites immi-
nent lawless action, and fighting words, are all outside First Amend-
ment protection.217 Lies, hate speech, and propaganda are not in-
cluded in this list.218 In 2012, the Supreme Court established, in Al-
varez,219 that there is no general First Amendment exception for 
false statements and declined to create a new category for them.220 
The plaintiff, Xavier Alvarez, announced in a speech that he re-
ceived the Congressional Medal of Honor when in fact he did not.221 
Alvarez was then indicted under the Stolen Valor Act (the “Act”), 
which made it illegal to lie about receiving military decorations or 
medals.222 Having established that false speech fell under the 
 
 214 See id. at 326 (“First and foremost, § 112 is not narrowly directed at the 
content of speech but at any activity, including speech, that has the prohibited 
effects. Moreover, § 112, unlike § 22–1115, does not prohibit picketing; it only 
prohibits activity undertaken to ‘intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass.’” (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2))). 
 215 Id. at 321, 324, 327. 
 216 Tinker v. Des Moines: What is Symbolic Speech? When is it Protected?, 
LANDMARK CASES, https://www.landmarkcases.org/tinker-v-des-moines/tinker-
v-des-moines-what-is-symbolic-speech-when-is-it-protected. 
 217 See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–
64 (1982). 
 218 See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–64. In contrast, 
the GFCC has recognized that these same categories of speech fall outside the 
purview of Basic Law protection when their use interferes with other enumerated 
rights. See supra Part II. 
 219 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 220 See id. at 718 (“Absent from those few categories where the law allows 
content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amend-
ment for false statements.”). 
 221 Id. at 713. 
 222 Id. at 713–14. 
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protection of the First Amendment,223 the Court concluded that the 
law must be examined under strict scrutiny.224 To satisfy its burden, 
the government argued that the Act was similar to other constitu-
tional restrictions on false statements, including false statements 
made to a government official, perjury, and falsely representing a 
government official.225 The Court rejected this argument, stating 
that the listed examples, unlike the Act, each carry a higher purpose 
than a general restriction on false statements.226 The government, 
moreover, failed to show that the Act implemented the least restric-
tive means to achieving this end.227 For instance, the government 
did not show why lesser restrictive means, such as refutation of the 
false statement or an online database of Medal of Honor winners, 
are not more appropriate.228 
Additionally, as the Court made clear in R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, hate speech remains protected under the First Amendment.229 
In R.A.V., the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that 
banned the display of any symbol that “one knows or has reasonable 
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”230 Delivering the 
opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia emphasized that, while burning 
a cross may be categorized as “fighting words,” an unprotected cat-
egory of speech,231 the statute was still unconstitutional because it 
represented impermissible viewpoint discrimination.232 While the 
 
 223 See id. at 719 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Gov-
ernment advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protec-
tion.”). 
 224 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724. 
 225 Id. at 719–20. 
 226 See id. at 721. 
 227 See id. at 728. 
 228 See id. at 729. 
 229 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
 230 Id. at 380 (quoting S. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, 
Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). The statute specifically banned: the display 
of “‘a burning cross[,] or Nazi swastika, [or other symbol] which one knows or 
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.’” Id. 
 231 Id. at 393. 
 232 See id. at 391. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court established that violence 
must be imminent before hateful speech may be proscribed. See Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
604 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:572 
 
burning of the cross fell into an unprotected category of speech, the 
statute was still discriminating only against hateful viewpoints 
within the unprotected category.233 In other words, the government 
cannot discriminate against viewpoint-based hate speech even 
within an unprotected category.234 The decision highlights the 
Court’s unwillingness to place hate speech into an existing category 
of unprotected speech. 
Years later, in Virginia v. Black,235 the Court actually upheld a 
Virginia ordinance outlawing cross burnings done with the intent to 
intimidate.236 Rather than overturning R.A.V., the Black Court dis-
tinguished the case at hand by finding that the Virginia statute at 
issue applied without regard to the viewpoint of the cross burner.237 
The Court, therefore, classified the burning of a cross with the intent 
to intimidate as a “true threat,” a category of speech not protected 
under the First Amendment.238 As it stands, under R.A.V., and still 
under Black, hate speech is afforded First Amendment protection, 
unless it can be shown to be a “true threat.”239 
Unless the Supreme Court recognizes propaganda as an unpro-
tected category of speech, it too falls under the protection of the Free 
Speech Clause.240 Therefore, the government must show that the 
propaganda speech at issue falls within an already excepted category 
of speech.241 In R.A.V., for instance, the Court was unwilling to place 
hate speech into an already excepted category; therefore, any gov-
ernment regulation of racially motivated, or otherwise hateful 
 
 233 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377, 391–92. 
 234 See id. 
 235 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 236 Id. at 363 (“The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burn-
ings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly 
virulent form of intimidation.”). 
 237 Id. at 362 (reasoning that the “Virginia statute does not single out for op-
probrium only that speech directed toward ‘one of the specified disfavored top-
ics’” of race, gender, religion, or political affiliation, but rather solely focuses on 
whether intimidation was intended). 
 238 Id. at 360. 
 239 Id. at 363; see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377, 391–92. 
 240 Lincoln Caplan, Should Facebook and Twitter Be Regulated Under the 
First Amendment?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/should-facebook-and-twitter-be-regulated-under-the-first-amendment/. 
 241 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. 
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viewpoints, failed constitutional review.242 Following R.A.V., if the 
government cannot sufficiently argue that propaganda online falls 
into one of these excepted categories, any law banning it would have 
to advance a compelling government interest and be narrowly tai-
lored—a conclusion this speech-protective Supreme Court is un-
likely to make.243 The next Part further explores this question of 
whether propaganda could be placed in an already excepted cate-
gory of speech, or if the Court is more likely to find that it is pro-
tected under the First Amendment. 
IV. WOULD THE NETWORK ENFORCEMENT ACT BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE UNITED STATES? 
As discussed above, German freedom of expression under the 
Basic Law differs from its U.S. counterpart in significant ways. 
First, in Germany, free speech is explicitly limited by the text of the 
Basic Law, whereas the U.S. Constitution has no written limits.244 
Second, there are far more exceptions to protected speech under 
German jurisprudence, whereas the categories of unprotected 
speech in the United States are extremely limited.245 Keeping these 
differences in mind, an important question arises: whether an act 
regulating propaganda, like the Network Enforcement Act,246 would 
be deemed unconstitutional in U.S. courts. 
To answer this question, a two-part analysis must be em-
ployed.247 First, it must be determined whether the First Amendment 
 
 242 See id. at 391–92 (“One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all 
‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would 
insult and provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’ St. Paul has no such author-
ity to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to 
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”). 
 243 See id. at 381, 399. 
 244 Compare [GG] [BASIC LAW], supra note 7, art. 1, § 1 (“Human dignity 
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state author-
ity.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”). 
 245 Compare supra Part II.C, with supra Part III.A. 
 246 NetzDG, supra note 6, at § 3(2). 
 247 Russell W. Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 775, 779 (1988). The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all 
constitutional limits. See id. In applying any constitutional restriction on 
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protects the regulated speech at issue or if the speech falls into an 
unprotected category.248 Then, it must be determined what level of 
scrutiny applies, depending on whether the law is content-based or 
content-neutral.249 For the purposes of this Note, I will be examining 
whether a law requiring social media companies to remove “propa-
ganda” specifically would be unconstitutional in the United States. 
Focusing on “propaganda” (which is one of the types of speech 
banned by the NEA),250 narrows the scope of the analysis while still 
encompassing a type of speech that falls under the broad term of 
“fake news.” 
A. Is Propaganda Protected Speech? 
While there is no set definition for propaganda,251 there is a gen-
eral consensus that “propaganda attempts to influence the thinking 
of people.”252 For the purposes of this Note, propaganda is defined 
as false or misleading facts for the purpose of manipulating real-
ity.253 The two most important aspects of propaganda are (1) it is 
self-serving, meaning it is meant to benefit the speaker, not the 
 
government action, one should ask first whether the limit is applicable—e.g., is 
this the kind of government action that is subject to this limit—and second, 
whether the respondent complied with the rules the Supreme Court has developed 
for enforcing the limit. Id. at 783–84. In short, the analysis on the merits of any 
constitutional limit focuses on two questions: (1) “applicability” and (2) “compli-
ance.” Id. at 779. 
 248 Supra Part III. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See Tahira Mohamedbhai, Germany Cabinet Approves Bill for Social Me-
dial Platforms to Report Hate Speech to Authorities, JURIST (Feb. 21, 2020, 9:03 
AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/02/germany-cabinet-approves-bill-for-
social-medial-platforms-to-report-hate-speech-to-authorities/. 
 251 See, e.g., Propaganda, 13 DIG. INT’L L. 982 (1968) (listing various defini-
tions of propaganda). 
 252 Id. at 982–83 (quoting L. John Martin, International Propaganda 199 
(1958)). 
 253 See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 490 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting 
in part) (“[D]eclaration of Leonard W. Doob, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Psy-
chology at Yale University: . . . .’[A]s the history of the last seventy years sug-
gests, to call something propaganda is to assert that it communicates hidden or 
deceitful ideas; that concealed interests are involved; that unfair or insidious meth-
ods or [sic] being employed; that its dissemination is systematic and organized in 
some way.’”). 
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listener; and (2) it manipulates the audience in some way—it might 
be through lying or by appealing to racism or other base emotions.254 
With this definition in mind, the question of whether propaganda 
is protected speech under the First Amendment must be answered. 
As discussed in the preceding Part, in general, all communication 
and association for purposes of communication are protected by the 
First Amendment.255 Certain categories of speech, however, are not 
protected. These exceptions include criminal speech, incitement, 
fraud, fighting words, obscenity, child pornography, and commer-
cial speech that is misleading or solely concerned with illegal activ-
ity.256 Exceptions are extremely limited, and are “confined to the 
few ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar 
to the bar.’”257 Noticeably missing from this exhaustive list are 
lies258 and hate speech259—categories under which propaganda, as 
defined for purposes of this Note, could fall. 
In R.A.V., the Court considered whether hate speech would be 
protected under the First Amendment and ultimately decided that 
hate speech did not fall under any of the excepted categories of 
 
 254 See Corbin, supra note 15 (manuscript at 9–11) (defining key characteris-
tics of propaganda to be “manipulativeness”—intentionally undermining rea-
soned analysis, specifically by relying on falsehoods—and self-serving in nature). 
 255 See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). As the 
Court stated in Mosley, “[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.” Id. 
 256 See Kelso, supra note 181, at 324; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–
64 (1982). 
 257 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (first citing United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010); and then quoting Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring)). 
 258 See id. at 718. In contrast, the Supreme Court has reiterated that lies are 
protected speech. See id. at 718 (“Absent from those few categories where the law 
allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First 
Amendment for false statements.”). 
 259 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). In fact, the Supreme Court 
unanimously reaffirmed in Matal v. Tam that there is no hate speech exception to 
the First Amendment. Id. (“We have said time and again that ‘the public expres-
sion of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves of-
fensive to some of their hearers.’”) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 
592 (1969))). 
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speech.260 Similarly, in Alvarez, the Court rejected to categorize lies 
as excepted speech or to place it within an already established cate-
gory.261 Here, propaganda shares similarities with both lies and hate 
speech and would likely be categorized the same way: as protected 
speech. The Court has been explicitly reluctant to add new catego-
ries of exceptions.262 Under U.S. free speech doctrine, propaganda, 
therefore, would likely be categorized by the Court as protected 
speech.263 
B. What Level of Scrutiny Should be Applied? 
The next step in analyzing whether a law regulating propaganda 
online is constitutional hinges on the level of scrutiny the Court may 
apply.264 In order for a regulation to be content-neutral, it must be 
both viewpoint-neutral and subject-matter neutral.265 In other words, 
the government cannot regulate speech based on the ideology of the 
message266 or the topic of the speech.267 In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
the Court defined content-based regulation as “a law [that] applies 
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or 
message expressed.”268 The Court, therefore, must consider whether 
a law “draws distinctions based on the message a speaker 
 
 260 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–94 (1992). 
 261 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717 (first citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 470 (2010); and then quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. 
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 262 See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011) (“[N]ew cate-
gories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that 
concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.” (citing United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469–72 (2010))). 
 263 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709. 
 264 See supra Part III.1.B. 
 265 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 57, 
59, 61 (1983). 
 266 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 312, 333–34 (1988) (declaring unconsti-
tutional a District of Columbia ordinance that prohibited display of signs critical 
of a foreign government within 500 feet of that government’s embassy). 
 267 See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (finding a law prohibiting 
all picketing in residential neighborhoods, unless it was labor picketing connected 
to a place of employment, unconstitutional); United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (finding that a law regulating only sexual speech 
was a subject matter, or content-based, restriction and had to meet strict scrutiny 
review). 
 268 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). 
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conveys.”269 In Reed, the town’s sign code placed limits on tempo-
rary directional signs, regulating how long the signs could be dis-
played and the size.270 However, other signs, such as political or ide-
ological, were not regulated.271 The Court emphasized that the re-
strictions on any sign, therefore, depend solely on the content of the 
message on the sign.272 Based on the Court’s analysis and holding 
in Reed, a law requiring the removal of posts containing propaganda 
on social media would also be content-based regulation. For in-
stance, a post is defined as propaganda solely based on whether the 
post contains a self-serving, manipulative, and false political mes-
sage.273 This determination, to put it in the Court’s own words, 
would be based “entirely on the communicative content of the 
sign.”274 Moreover, propaganda posts would be removed, whereas 
other posts with different messages would not. Under Reed, subject-
ing certain posts to different treatment based on the ideas conveyed 
is content-based regulation of speech.275 Therefore, strict-scrutiny 
must be applied to any law requiring the removal of propaganda 
posts from social media.276 
 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. at 155. 
 271 Id. at 167. 
 272 Id. at 163–64 (“The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given 
sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign. If a sign in-
forms its reader of the time and place a book club will discuss John Locke’s Two 
Treatises of Government, that sign will be treated differently from a sign express-
ing the view that one should vote for one of Locke’s followers in an upcoming 
election, and both signs will be treated differently from a sign expressing an ide-
ological view rooted in Locke’s theory of government.”). 
 273 See Corbin, supra note 15 (manuscript at 9–11). 
 274 Id. at 164. 
 275 Id. at 168–69, 171, 173. 
 276 See id. at 172. Additionally, it is important to note that while the Supreme 
Court has not expressly held that Internet speech has more protection than any 
other speech, the language in Packingham v. North Carolina arguably indicates 
that the Court intends to keep Internet speech relatively unregulated. 137 S. Ct. 
1730, 1737 (2017). (“Social media allows users to gain access to information and 
communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to 
mind . . . . North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are 
the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, 
speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the 
vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”). 
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C. Can the Government Overcome Strict Scrutiny? 
To meet the requirements of strict scrutiny, the government must 
prove that the regulation at issue: (1) advances a compelling or over-
riding government ends and (2) is the least restrictive, most effective 
means to advance those ends.277 As to the first prong, the proposed 
statute asserts a government interest in preserving the democratic 
order. By eliminating propaganda, the government would be pro-
tecting the voters’ decision-making processes and, thus, ensuring 
that elections are not swayed by propaganda or fake news.278 
The government could also argue that there is a compelling in-
terest to uphold the integrity of government elections. It could be 
argued that the influx of online propaganda interferes with the dem-
ocratic process as people are unable to genuinely consent-by-
vote.279 The Supreme Court has accepted preserving the integrity of 
elections as a compelling government interest.280 In Burson v. Free-
man, the Supreme Court ruled that a Tennessee statute, forbidding 
the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign 
materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities, survived 
strict scrutiny.281 The Court found that there was a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in “protecting voters from confusion and undue 
influence”282 and that the government has an “indisputably . . . com-
pelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”283 
 
 277 See Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, supra note 190, at 909. 
 278 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (finding the preven-
tion of factionalism and the stability of political systems as compelling state in-
terests). The Court may accept this as a compelling government interest, because 
the Court has upheld parallel interests as compelling in the past. See id.; Am. Party 
of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974) (finding a compelling state inter-
ests in preserving integrity of electoral process and regulating number of candi-
dates on ballot so as to avoid voter confusion). 
 279 Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” 
Standard, 82 TUL. L. REV. 889, 897 (2008) (“If voters are misled, elections may 
not accurately reflect the desires of the electorate.”). 
 280 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (finding a compelling 
government interest in protecting its citizen’s right to vote freely and effectively). 
 281 See id. at 193, 207, 213–14. 
 282 See id. at 199. The Court also emphasized that there is a “‘right to vote 
freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society.’” 
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)). 
 283 Id. at 196 (quoting Eu v. S.F. City Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 
228–29 (1989)). 
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Not only did the government in Burson show that there was a com-
pelling interest in protecting voters from undue influence, but the 
government also showed that the statute was narrowly tailored and 
necessary to serve that interest.284 
However, to prove there is a compelling interest, as Justice 
Scalia wrote in Brown v. Entertainment Merchant Association, 
“[t]he State must specifically identify an ‘actual problem’ in need of 
solving . . . and the curtailment of free speech must be actually nec-
essary to the solution.”285 Therefore, the government must prove 
that fake news, specifically propaganda, causes confusion among 
voters and directly alters the outcome of elections and that eliminat-
ing propaganda is necessary to eliminate that confusion.286 In sum, 
while preventing corruption and upholding the integrity of demo-
cratic elections are compelling interests,287 the state must show there 
is actual, concrete risk posed by the dissemination of propaganda on 
social media.288 
Even if the Court accepts that there is a compelling government 
interest behind requiring the removal of propaganda from social me-
dia sites, the government must still prove that the statute is the least 
restrictive means to ensure that end.289 If there is a less restrictive 
alternative to accomplish a compelling interest, the statute will not 
 
 284 Id. at 206–11 (finding that based on history of voter fraud and intimidation, 
and on past findings that interferences right before voting can be significant for a 
person deciding on a candidate, requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from polling 
centers “does not constitute an unconstitutional compromise”). 
 285 See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (quoting United 
States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)). 
 286 Id.; see United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000) 
(establishing that “the Government must present more than anecdote and suppo-
sition”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (“There must 
be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be pre-
vented.”). 
 287 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). 
 288 See Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 822; see also Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 
725. 
 289 Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
395 (1992)) (stating that the government can only meet requirements of strict 
scrutiny if regulation at issue is justified by a “compelling government interest 
and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”). 
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pass strict scrutiny.290 The government, therefore, has the burden of 
proving why other methods, such as counter-speech, education, or 
self-regulation, would not be sufficient in combatting the issue prop-
aganda presents to the democratic process.291 As the Court in Burson 
emphasized, it is extremely rare for the Court to accept government 
regulation over another recourse.292 
Most notably, the Court has required the government to show 
that counter-speech would not work to achieve its interests.293 Jus-
tice Kennedy in Alvarez opined that “[t]he remedy for speech that is 
false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free soci-
ety. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the unin-
formed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”294 
Proving that counter-speech would not be sufficiently effective in 
combatting the effects of propaganda online would be a difficult 
burden to overcome, as there are a plethora of legitimate news 
sources and fact-checking organizations that can work to debunk 
fake political posts.295 In addition, the government could itself invest 
in the creation of government-run fact-checking sites and online po-
litical news outlets.296 It is clear then that the Court would find there 
are other, less restrictive means to remedy the effect of propaganda 
on elections. 
 
 290 See Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 816 (“When a plausible, less re-
strictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Gov-
ernment’s obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its 
goals.”). 
 291 See id.; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 190, at 792. 
 292 Burson, 504 U.S. at 211 (“[W]e reaffirm that it is the rare case in which we 
have held that a law survives strict scrutiny. This, however, is such a rare case.”). 
 293 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726. 
 294 Id. at 727. 
 295 See POLITIFACT, https://www.politifact.com/; Fact Checker, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-Checker/; Fact 
Checks, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/fact-checks. 
 296 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729. Justice Kennedy in Alvarez suggested a sim-
ilar solution, stating that the government could create a database listing past Medal 
of Honor recipients, which would protect the integrity of the military awards sys-
tem while, at the same time, avoiding a restriction on speech. Id. 
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V. THE COUNTER-SPEECH SOLUTION 
The Supreme Court has continuously denied government regu-
lation in favor of counter-speech;297 however, counter-speech in 
America may not be entirely effective.298 First, in the age of social 
media, most people receive their news on Twitter, Facebook, and 
other social media sites.299 Each of these online sources utilize ex-
tremely sophisticated algorithms that provide every unique user with 
tailored content based on what that user typically reads, who that 
user’s followers are, and what those followers read or post about.300 
Therefore, as a society, we are only being exposed to information 
that social media sites have calculated we will be predisposed to 
agree with and enjoy.301 The sophistication of social media has es-
sentially done away with the very idea of counter-speech.302 
Therefore, if the government is unable to regulate what is posted 
on social media, government regulation of social media algorithms 
is another way to ensure that there is a free flow of information.303 
Regulations should require that search engines and social media 
companies make it explicitly known to “users that they are subject 
to algorithms,” detail how the algorithms are filtering posts or search 
results, and allow users to manually disable or change how the 
 
 297 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fal-
lacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
 298 See Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution: 
First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 55, 67–68 (2018) (discussing inadequacy of counter-speech in the digital era). 
 299 See Mike Vorhaus, People Increasingly Turn to Social Media For News, 
FORBES (June 24, 2020, 9:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikevorhaus/
2020/06/24/people-increasingly-turn-to-social-media-for-news/#10dd99f63bcc. 
 300 See Elizabeth Van Couvering, Is Relevance Relevant? Market, Science, 
and War: Discourses of Search Engine Quality, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED 
COMM. 866, 871–72 (2007); Theodora Lau & Uday Akkaraju, When Algorithms 
Decide Whose Voices Will Be Heard, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/11/when-algorithms-decide-whose-voice-will-be-heard. 
 301 See Couvering, supra note 300, at 875. 
 302 See id.; Lau & Akkaraju, supra note 300. 
 303 See Julia K. Brotman, Access, Transparency, and Control: A Proposal to 
Restore the Marketplace of Ideas by Regulating Search Engine Algorithms, 39 
WHITTIER L. REV. 33, 50–53 (2018) (discussing regulating algorithms). 
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content is filtered.304 These proposed changes would protect infor-
mational autonomy, diversity, and quality, as well as the democratic 
society overall. However, it is unclear whether algorithms can be 
regulated without violating the Free Speech Clause.305 
Another possible solution, which does not require any govern-
ment regulation, would be to invest in the U.S. news infrastructure. 
Currently, it is almost impossible for Americans to access neutral 
news sources.306 Trust in the news media in the United States is ex-
tremely low overall307 because most available news sources are ex-
tremely partisan,308 and the decline of local newspapers has likely 
only exacerbated the divide. As it stands, for counter-speech to be 
effective, there needs to be a major shift in American trust of the 
media. The solution, as proposed in this Note, is to fully invest in 
our public news networks. Specifically, the government should 
 
 304 See id. at 54. The list set forth by Brotman is more narrowly tailored for 
search engines, specifically Google, whereas I have expanded the regulation to 
include social media sites. 
 305 See id. at 61–62. (discussing the constitutionality of regulating algorithms). 
According to Brotman, it is likely that algorithms are protected speech under the 
editorial discretion doctrine. Id. However, Brotman goes on to argue that a court 
should uphold the proposed regulation as a constitutional restriction on speech. 
Id. at 62–63. 
 306 See The Berlin School of Creative Leadership, 10 Journalism Brands 




 307 See Amy Mitchell et al., Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical 
Problem That Needs to Be Fixed, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-
a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/. 
 308 See Shawn Langlio, How Biased is Your News Source? You Probably 
Won’t Agree with This Chart, MKT. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2018, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-biased-is-your-news-source-you-prob-
ably-wont-agree-with-this-chart-2018-02-28; Julie Bosman, How the Collapse of 
Local News Is Causing a “National Crisis,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/us/local-news-disappear-pen-amer-
ica.html 
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invest more in the CPB,309 which includes the Public Broadcasting 
Network (“PBS”)310 and National Public Radio.311 
The United Kingdom’s BBC network stands as an effective ex-
ample of a well-funded, well-respected public news organization.312 
According to a Pew Research Center survey about news media and 
politics in the United Kingdom, British adults, “both those on the 
ideological right and left, cite the BBC as their main news 
source.”313 Additionally, in the United Kingdom, around eight-in-
ten adults (79%) say they trust the public news organization BBC.314 
In contrast, Pew Research Center explored the attitude towards news 
media in the United States, finding that out of thirty main-stream 
media organizations, not a single one was “trusted by more than 
50% of all U.S. adults.”315 
The BBC is based on a Royal Charter,316 granting incorporation 
and full independence to act solely “in the public interest, serving 
all audiences through the provision of impartial, high-quality and 
distinctive output and services which inform, educate and 
 
 309 About Public Media, CPB, https://www.cpb.org/aboutpb (last visited Dec. 
20, 2020). 
 310 PBS, https://www.pbs.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 
 311 NPR, https://www.npr.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 
 312 See BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18027956 (last vis-
ited Dec. 20, 2020). 
 313 Amy Mitchell et al., Fact Sheet: News Media and Political Attitudes in the 
United Kingdom, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 17, 2018), https://www.pewre-
search.org/global/fact-sheet/news-media-and-political-attitudes-in-the-united-
kingdom/. 
 314 Id. 
 315 U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/u-s-media-
polarization-and-the-2020-election-a-nation-divided/. 
 316 DEPARTMENT FOR CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, COPY OF THE ROYAL 
CHARTER FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE BRITISH BROADCASTING NETWORK, 
Dec. 2016 [hereinafter CHARTER FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF BBC], https://as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/577829/57964_CM_9365_Charter_Accessible.pdf; see Letter to Lord 
Chancellor on the granting of a Royal Charter to the BBC from The Earl of Bel-
four (Nov. 19, 1926), https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/re-
sources/twenties-britain-part-two/royal-charter-for-bbc/. 
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entertain.”317 The BBC is further regulated by Ofcom,318 the com-
munications regulatory authority in the United Kingdom.319 Ofcom 
sets forth various rules and regulation to ensure the impartiality of 
the BBC, such as the Ofcom Broadcasting Code (“the Code”).320 
Under Section 5 of the Code: “[N]ews, in whatever form, must be 
reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality.”321 
The BBC is a unique organization. While funded by taxes,322 the 
BBC is set up as an independent corporation, yet it still must adhere 
to certain rules and regulations323 to ensure its impartiality and its 
mission as an organization purely for the people.324 Despite its dis-
tinctiveness as a quasi-government organization, or perhaps because 
of it, the BBC is cited as the main news source for people on both 
left and right ideologies in the United Kingdom.325 
While the United States does in fact have a public news sys-
tem,326 it lacks the reach the BBC commands.327 The disparity in 
viewership most likely stems from the gap in funding between the 
 
 317 CHARTER FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF BBC, supra note 316, at art. 3, § 5. 
 318 Id. at art. 44; Ofcom Broadcasting Code, Jan. 2019 [hereinafter Ofcom 
Broadcasting Code], https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/
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 319 Communications Act 2003 c. 198 (Eng.) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2003/21/section/198. 
 320 Ofcom Broadcasting Code, supra note 318. 
 321 Id. at § 5. 
 322 See BBC, License Fee and Funding, https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/
governance/licencefee (last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 
 323 See Ofcom Broadcasting Code, supra note 318. 
 324 About the BBC, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/mis-
sion (last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 
 325 Fact Sheet: News Media and Political Attitudes in the United Kingdom, 
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sides of the ideological spectrum choose different news sources. See U.S. Media 
Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided, supra note 315. 
 326 See 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1967). Under the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 
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FAQ, https://www.cpb.org/faq (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) (“CPB is the steward 
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 327 PBS reaches approximately 109 million viewers each month, whereas the 
BBC reaches 426 million people weekly. Overview, PBS, http://about.lunch-
box.pbs.org/about/about-pbs/overview/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2020); BBC, GROUP 
ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS at 12, 48, 50, 52 (2018–2019), https://down-
loads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualreport/2018-19.pdf. 
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two entities. For instance, PBS is funded mostly by government 
grants and private donations.328 PBS brings in approximately $600 
million a year in funding,329 compared to the over £3 billion the BBC 
receives from a licensing tax.330 To truly combat the effects of fake 
news in the United States, and to ensure that counter-speech is actu-
ally effective, the U.S. government needs to fund the CPB and PBS 
more appropriately. With nearly 600% more funding than PBS, it is 
no surprise that the BBC’s reach is similarly proportioned. 
Another important difference between the BBC and PBS is the 
regulation structure. The BBC is regulated by Ofcom and the strict 
“rules of impartiality” it sets;331 however, the CPB and PBS are not 
similarly regulated.332 The public news in the United States does not 
have the same impartiality standards as the United Kingdom. 333 If 
counter-speech is going to be used as an effective tool against fake 
news, there must be a reliable, impartial, news source to command 
the trust and respect of viewers within the United States. 
Overall, if it is not possible to combat the fake news problem in 
the United States through government regulation, then the United 
States must invest in its news infrastructure to ensure there is suffi-
cient informational diversity and quality. 
 
 328 See PBS, PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCAST AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 5–8, (2019), 
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 331 Content Standards, OFCOM, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-
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(last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 
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(“‘the doctrine’ involves a two-fold duty: (1) The broadcaster must devote a rea-
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tunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view.”) The Fairness Doctrine, 
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ident Reagan. See id.; Dan Fletcher, A Brief History of The Fairness Doctrine, 
TIME (Feb. 20, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1880786,00.html. 
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CONCLUSION 
A statute requiring the removal of propaganda material on social 
media sites, like Germany’s NEA, would likely be unconstitutional 
in the United States. First, the speech at issue, propaganda, is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.334 Second, the regulation in question 
qualifies as content-based because it only targets a particular type of 
message and topic.335 The Supreme Court, moreover, would apply a 
strict scrutiny review of the statute, a heavy burden for the govern-
ment to overcome.336 Under strict scrutiny, the government may be 
able to prove that there is a compelling government interest in pro-
tecting the democratic order and process. However, it is unlikely that 
the Court will accept the statute as the only means of achieving that 
end, where other measures, such as counter-speech, are likely to 
remedy the problem in a less speech-restrictive manner.337 
However, social media is certainly changing the way we com-
municate with one another, and the way that we gather information. 
An argument can therefore be made that U.S. free speech laws are 
too stringent. As the Court itself has admitted in Packingham v. 
North Carolina, “we cannot appreciate yet” the “full dimensions and 
vast potential” of the “Cyber Age.”338 While this Note discusses a 
purely hypothetical statute, it becomes more plausible every day that 
there may need to be some form of government regulation on social 
media. The 2016 and 2020 elections, and events throughout 2020 
and early 2021, have highlighted the huge role that social media now 
plays in our politics and society. Yet, as Justice Alito points out in 
his dissent in Packingham, the Court itself has not “heeded its own 
admonition of caution” regarding the regulation of social media.339 
The language employed by the majority in Packingham “indicates 
that the Court intends to keep Internet speech as unregulated as 
 
 334 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (declining to add 
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possible.”340 There will, in fact, be consequences to this “undisci-
plined dicta”341 as the influence of social media continues to rise, 
and the government lacks any ability to regulate the information ex-
changed online. 
As this Note has explored, an attempt by the government to reg-
ulate the dissemination of fake news or, specifically, propaganda 
would likely be deemed unconstitutional. The very real threat to our 
democratic order and voting process would thus go unchecked, 
while countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have 
taken concrete steps towards regulating the wild west of social me-
dia. The longstanding and pervasive distrust of the government that 
underlies many decisions to uphold free speech in the face of gov-
ernment regulation serves as the greatest barrier to propaganda reg-
ulation.342 A persuasive argument to overcome this barrier is that the 
cost of government censorship will invariably exceed the cost of 
regulating (arguably harmful) speech343 and that reliance on coun-
ter-speech is misplaced. Unless there is significant investment in a 
neutral, reliable news source, counter-speech will simply not be ef-
fective in combatting the real issues that fake news causes within 
our democratic society. 
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